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RECENT DECISIONS
ment upon his default. In addition, one form contains a novation
which would appear to modify the commission provisions of the
listing contractY The listing agreement, on which plaintiff in the
principal case based its claim, recites:
"All deposits made shall be retained by you in a trust
account. If forfeited by the buyer, said monies shall first
pay for cash advancements made by you; one-half the bal-
ance, but not in excess of the commission agreed upon, shall
belong to you. The balance shall belong to the undersigned."
The significance of this clause was not argued in briefs of
counsel, and the Court makes no mention of it in its decision. It
is suggested that such clause might reasonably have been con-
strued as limiting the commission, in event of purchaser-default,
to one-half of the forfeited earnest money. If so construed, the
limitation would be far more liberal toward the seller than is the
standard novation clause, cited at note 9, supra. Certainly it would
be unreasonable to construe the clause so as to give broker one-half
of the forfeited deposit in addition to his full commission. The
absence of any express limitation in the plaintiff's listing contract
would not authorize such unreasonable construction, especially in
view of the rule that doubtful provisions of contracts are construed
most strictly against the party who drew the contract.10
It is unfortunate that the matter of the buyer's $1000 down
payment was not put in issue." Future actions, however, based
on similar facts will undoubtedly involve the application of for-
feitures to any commissions claimed. Inasmuch as such application
may still result in the seller's personal liability for a balance of the
commission, it is suggested that Sec. 240.10, Wis. Stats., be
amended so as to limit the broker's commission in buyer default
cases to the amount of the forfeited down payment, or the amount
provided in the commission agreement, whichever is smaller.
ROBERT CHOINSKI
Class Gifts: Time When Class Closes-Rule of Convenience-
Testator left a will bequeathing to his grandchildren the sum of
fifty thousand dollars in trust. The income from the principal was
9 Offer to Purchase form No. 168 ibid., incorporates the following clause in the
seller's acceptance: "For and in consideration of the services furnished, the
undersigned agrees to pay to- as commission, the sum of $ -
and in the event the deposit made by the buyer shall be forfeit, such deposit
shall first apply to your commission; the balance, if any, shall belong to the
undersigned. In such event, the commission shall not exceed the deposit."
10 Deree v. Reliable Tool & Machine, Inc., 250 Wis. 224, 26 N.W. 2d 673 (1947).
"' A reading of the cases and briefs disclosed both the amount of the down
payment and the fact that it was returned to the buyers. The sellers presently
have an action pending against the plaintiff for recovery of the down pay-
ment.
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to accumulate until the grandchildren became of age. After each
grandchild became of age he was to receive the income which had
accumulated on his share, said income to be paid to him annually
until he reached the age of thirty years. After each grandchild
reached the age of thirty, he was to be paid his full share of the
principal sum. Six grandchildren were alive at testator's death.
Three more were subsequently born before the oldest reached the
age of thirty. In a hearing brought by the trustee to construe the
terms of the will, the county court found a class gift which vested
in those grandchildren alive at testator's death, subject to being
reopened with the birth of each additional grandchild as long as
there were assets remaining in the trust. On appeal the Wisconsin
Supreme Court held, inter alia, that membership in the class closed
when the oldest grandchild arrived at the age of thirty years, and
hence grandchildren born thereafter could not become members of
the class. Estate of Evans, 274 Wis. 459, 80 N.W. 2d 408 (1957),
rehearing denied, 247 Wis. 472, 81 N.W. 2d 489 (1957).
The problem before the court was that of determining maxi-
mum class membership.' There did not appear to be any serious
problem of minimum class membership, 2 as the Supreme Court
seemed to find a vested gift, subject to open, affirming the county
court. But the lower court's finding of increase in class member-
ship was modified, the Supreme Court citing the rule that:
" * * .membership in the class is determined when the time
for distribution has arrived. The class may increase until
that time and persons born thereafter are excluded." 3
Attorneys practicing in Wisconsin courts now have an addi-
tional rule of construction to bear in mind. Often denominated
the "rule of convenience," it has a long history both in the United
StateS4 and in England.'
In considering the merits of the adopted rule, it must be
realized that it is a rule of construction, ie., a rebuttable presump-
tion,6 rather than a binding rule of law. The construction of a will
1 The determination of maximum class membership involves ascertaining the
time for closing of a class. SIMES, FUTURE INTERESTS §91 (1951).2 The problem of minimum class membership is one of determining the time
for "vesting" of the class gift, the word "vest" being used to refer to trans-
missibility or the absence of a condition of survivorship to the date of dis-
tribution. Id. at §92.
32 SIMES AND SMITH, THE LAW OF FUTURE INTERESTS §634 (2d ed. 1956).
4 For representative decisions employing the rule, see B.M.C. Durfee Trust
Co. v. Taylor, 325 Mass. 201, 89 N.E. 2d 777 (1950); In re Murphy's Estate,
99 Mont. 114, 43 P. 2d 233 (1935) ; In re Austin 's Estate, 315 Pa. 449, 173 Atl.
278 (1934); Williams v. Harrison, 72 Ind. App. 245, 123 N.E. 245 (1919);
Thomas v. Thomas, 149 Mo. App. 52, 51 S.W. Ill. (1899).
5 The famed English case of Andrew v. Partington, 2 Cox 223, 3 Bro. C.C. 401(1791), appears to have laid down the "convenience" doctrine.
6 2 SIMES AND SMITH, op. cit. supra note 3, §633.
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has long been recognized to be guided by the intention of the
testator.7 This intent is to be ascertained from a full and complete
consideration of the entire will read in light of surrounding cir-
cumstances." However, since the testator in a class gift situation
has probably never thought of the problem which has arisen fol-
lowing his death, it is quite futile to speak of his intent.9 Rather
what the courts appear to be doing is to effectuate such purpose
as the testator (that is, the average testator) may be presumed to
have had. Professor Simes treats the problem in this way:
"First, in the absence of words in the will or circum-
stances indicating a contrary intent, a testator would nor-
mally desire to include all persons possible within the class,
whenever they are born and whenever they die.
"Second, as a matter of convenience, it is desirable to
close the class as soon as distribution is possible."'1
It is submitted that the above solution effectuates such intent
as the testator has manifested. His group designation of bene-
ficiaries is indication of an intent to benefit all persons who fit into
such descriptive category. But such indicated "intent" is incon-
sistent with the existence of a date for distribution which requires
identification of the distributees and the shares to which each is
entitled. The resulting ambiguity requires resolution in the form
of application of the rule under discussion."'
Further justification for the rule has been advanced in that it
is in furtherance of public policy.' 2 Such policy appears to favor
the utiliztaion of the subject matter of the gift as soon as possible,
for economic reasons, and the avoidance of security measures which
would otherwise be necessary for the as yet unborn takers . 3
In discussing reasons for disregarding the rule, the frustration-
of-intent argument must be discarded as a form of question-begging.
As stated above, in most instances the intent of the testator is in
no way clearly revealed. To speak of a constructional rule as
thwarting the donor's intention would seem anomalous, as the ab-
7 See 2 GARY, WISICONSIN PROBATE LAW §597 (1944), where it is stated at
page 56 that: "Construction of a will is primarily a question of ascertaining
the intention of the testator." The author supports this proposition by citing
a myriad of cases arising in Wisconsin and neighboring jurisdictions.
s Will of Klinkert, 270 Wis. 362, 71 N.W. 2d 279 (1954).
9 It would appear noteworthy that in the case under review the Court spends
little time in search of a hidden intent. On motion for rehearing, a brief was
submitted that stressed the implication of the words "his full share," in con-
nection with the payment of the principal, as having but one meaning, i.e,
the exclusion of afterborn grandchildren from the class. The Court ignored
this contention. Estate of Evans, 274 Wis. 472, 81 N.W. 2d 489 (1957).
102 SIMES AND SMITH, op. cit. supra note 3.
1 See RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY §295, comment a (1936).
122 SIMES AND SMITH, op. cit. supra note 3, §633.
13RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY, Op. cit. supra note 11.
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sence of such intention has given rise to the necessity for employ-
ing such rule.
An alternative to use of the rule in the case of gifts in the
form of personal property has been proposed. 14  The court, at
the time of distribution to the first legatee to become of age, might
take a bond as security from such legatee to cover any beneficiaries
that might subsequently be born. This procedure could be re-
peated as each legatee reached the specified age. But the question
arises as to whether the beneficiaries are truly "enjoying" their
gift under such a device. Depending upon the amount of security
required, the donees might well incur more difficulty than deriva-
tion of benefits. That this solution appears impracticable to the
courts is evident when it is considered that it has not been applied
in cases involving realty. In distribution of realty, the incon-
veniences of posting security are lessened as the subject of the
gift can be enjoyed nonetheless. But as stated by an eminent
authority:
"Although the inconveniences suggested are more signi-
ficant when the subject matter of the gift is personal property
than when it is real property, . . . the general rule of con-
struction is applied to dispositions of either type of
property."' 15
Perhaps the greatest value of the use of the rule by the courts
in construction proceedings is that it precludes guessing as to the
true intent of the testator and gives a degree of symmetry and
predictability to the law.'6 Criticism may properly be launched
not at the rule itself but at its misapplication in a given case. The
Pennsylvania Supreme Court decried the employment of the rule
in the leading case of In re Earle's Estate," but close examination
reveals that the court there attempted to reach a decision com-
patible with it, when they found the true time of distribution to
be the distribution of the corpus of the residuary trust, stating:
" . . . the date of the audit of the executor's account as
evidenced by the award to the executors in their capacity of
trustees . . .was not the kind of distribution which warrants
the application of the rule of convenience."'' 8
14 See Note, 100 PA. L. REv. 908 (1952).
15 5 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY §22.41 (Casner ed. 1952).
16 As stated by Professor Casner in Class Gifts to "Heirs" or "Next of Kin,"
Increase in the Class Membership, 51 HARV. L. REV. 254 (1937), at page 308:
"The technique now employed ... has the merit of introducing some certainty
as to the result that will be reached by a court in certain types of cases. The
alternative (casting aside rules of construction and precedent and considering
each case completely divorced from what has gone before) would introduce
chaos and uncertainty without any compensating advantages."
17369 Pa. 52, 85 A.2d 90 (1951).
Is 369 Pa. at 57, 85 A.2d at 97.
A Student Note reviewing the Earle Estate case in 51 MICH. L. REV. 305,
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Proper utilization of the rule of construction is, of course,
dependent on correct determination of the date of distribution.
Professor Casner has the following to say regarding the time for
distribution:
"The period of distribution has arrived whenever a mem-
ber of the class described is entitled to demand the possession
of a share of the subject matter of the gift .... [l~t is not a
condition precedent to the right of a class member to de-
mand the possession of his share that it be no longer pos-
sible for additional members of the group described to be
born .... [I]f there are no outstanding unsatisfied interests
which precede the gift to the class and if all conditions which
are precedent to the interest of any member of the class have
been performed, the period of distribution has arrived."'"
One questionable facet of the case under review is the fact that
the appellant-trustee failed to argue that the proper time for dis-
tribution was at the time of the first accumulated income pay-
ment.20  It might have been reasoned that the reaching of twenty-
one by the oldest grandchild closed the class, inasmuch as a re-
computation of income to each beneficiary as of the birth of each
additional grandchild would be burdensome.2  But such argument
was not proposed to the court.
In concluding analysis of the so-called "rule of convenience"
it is obvious that the rule is not so convenient for potential class
at 306 gives a lucid discussion on the importance of properly determining
the date of distribution in applying the rule, stating: "As the lower court
interprets the facts, 'distribution' took place at the time the trusts were estab-
lished .... In giving the word 'distribution' such a technical definition the
lower court overlooks the fact that the terms used in the rule are subordinate
to the policy of convenience behind it."
19 5 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, op. cit. supra note 15, §22.40.
20 Respondents' brief at p. 21 apparently gives the treatment accorded the am-
biguous income provision: "The six living grandchildren were entitled to ac-
cumulations of interest up to the time of the birth of the first afterborn from
which time all the existing grandchildren were entitled to a share in the sub-
sequent accumulations. This would apply in the case of each additional birth,
at which time such birth diminished thenceforth the accumulations to the
others.
"When each grandchild reached 21 it would be entitled to accumulated
interest diminished by the amount of accumulated interest due any afterborn
from its birth to the date of payment of interest."
21 The text commentators have considered the effect of income provisions, and
apparently find that they are not so inconvenient as to create additional
problems, since only those children born before each income payment are
held entitled to share in the payment. See RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY, OP. Cit. l-
pra note 11, comment i; 2 SIMES AND SMITH, op. cit. supra note 3, §649; 5
AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, op. cit. supra note 15, §22.46. It is suggested
that the typical income provision calling for annual income payments until
the time of majority when the corpus will be distributed is distinguishable
from the income provision in the Evans case. In the case under review, the
income was to be "accumulated on each share," rather than paid out annually,
until the oldest child reached twenty-one. This would appear to impose a
more intricate computation duty on the trustee.
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members who are shut out by it.22 However, its logical application
is in cases where it is the only reasonable means of carrying out
the general objectives of the testator; and so, it is submitted, in
such instances it is a rule of necessary interpretation rather than
merely one of "convenience. ' 23 To avoid the consequences of the
rule, the testator (or more properly, the attorney drafting the
will) should state clearly when the class is to close.21
The writer has attempted to explain the new addition to the
long list of rules of construction employed by Wisconsin courts,
and to show that judicious use of such rule is sound. It is felt
that perhaps often in the past the actual problems of construction
have been obscured by the courts' frantic efforts to determine the
testator's purpose in cases where his individual intent was elusive.2 5
It is suggested that once such intent is determined to be beyond
ascertainment with reasonable certainty, the court is most correct
in employing such rules of construction as will effectuate the
probable intent of the average testator 26 and produce a decision
in accordance with sound public policy."
ADRIAN P. ScHOONE
Domestic Relations-Divorce Decree Incorporating Stipulation
That Child Shall Be Reared In A Given Religion-Defendant and
her husband agreed upon a property settlement and upon the cus-
tody of their children the day before the grant of their divorce de-
cree. This agreement gave the custody of their five year old son to
the defendant, and provided that the child be reared in the Roman
Catholic religion. The defendant was Protestant and the husband
was Catholic. Upon the request of the parties to the divorce, this
stipulation was incorporated into the divorce decree. Two years
later the husband filed "Information for Contempt" alleging that
the defendant has been, and is violating the divorce decree, in that
22 See Re Wenmoth's Estate, 37 Ch. Div. 226, 57 L.J. Ch. 649, 57 L.T. 709, 36
Wkly. Rep. 409 (1888).23Annot., 155 A.L.R. 757 (1945).
24 In Casner, op. cit. supra note 16, at 307, it is suggested: "The crying need in
this field of law is not for reform of the courts' technique in handling the
problem in class gifts . . ., nor reform of the precedents followed by the
courts in the solution of the problem of increase in the class membership.
Rather the crying need is for draftsmen, educated to the seriousness and dif-
ficulties of the task they are employed to perform."
25 E.g., in Will of Ehlers, 155 Wis. 46, 143 N.W. 1050 (1913), where after giving
extended cautioning in the use of rules of construction, and belittling their
value, the court concludes: "..... the intention of the testator should prevail
so far as it can be read out of the language used to express it." [Emphasis
supplied.] Query as to what the court would do if such intent could not begleaned from the will, the testator not having anticipated the problem.
26 See note 10 supra.
27 See note 12 supra.
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